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As a product of the Mexican revolution, the ejido was originally 
organized as an institution with the multiple aims of achieving 
political control over the peasantry, representing peasants in their 
relations with the State, and assisting production by smallholders. 
These multiple objectives, which were initially consistent and 
supported a successful phase of growth and improved welfare, 
became increasingly contradictory, precipitating a major crisis in 
both production and rural welfare. By 1992, when Article 27 of 
the 1917 Constitution was reformed, the ejido was characterized 
by strong State intervention in the internal life of the ejido, 
including its decision-making mechanisms, the conditions for 
access to public resources, and the management of rural wel-
fare. It was this very decay of the ejido system in a global 
context of political and economic liberalization that induced 
the profound reforms initiated under President Salinas, which 
include a redefinition of the relations between the State and 
households in the ejido sector, a change in the public institu-
tions serving the sector, a reform of the legal framework that 
regulates access to land, and a modification in the instruments 
of agricultural policy. This article describes the initial impact 
of these reforms on the ejido sector. 
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I 
The peasantry considered legally as minors: 
the conflict of rights, 1910-1940 1 
The social pact which guaranteed stability and peace 
in the countryside for much of the second half of this 
century and made it possible to institutionalize the 
conflicts which had arisen culminated its develop-
ment during the regime of President Cárdenas,2 
which came after 25 years of armed revolution, in the 
course of which the peasant revolt was militarily de-
feated, its political programme and social demands 
were incorporated into the constitutional framework 
of the new regime, its leaders were subjected to re-
pression or were integrated into the political system, 
the other powers challenging State hegemony in the 
rural sector -the big landowners and the clergy- were 
politically split up, and the new institutional system 
was consolidated on the basis of corporative comple-
mentarity between the State agencies and the national 
farmers' organizations. 
The basic provisions incorporated in article 27 of 
the Constitution were drafted in line with the views 
of a wide-ranging intellectual movement which exer-
cised a great deal of influence over the vision of the 
new political regime and had already begun to ex-
press itself in the final days of the Porfirio Díaz 
dictatorship.3 One of the central points of this move-
ment was its challenge to the conservative role 
played by the hacienda.4 The reform of land distribu-
tion was viewed mainly as a policy for modern-
ization, with the main task of removing constraints 
preventing the development of capitalism and the 
strengthening of the domestic market. It was there-
fore considered that land distribution reform would 
D This article corresponds to a paper prepared for presentation 
at the 23rd International Conference of Agricultural Economists, 
Sacramento, California, August 1997. 
1
 This section is based on Gordillo (1988b). 
2
 President Lázaro Cárdenas governed Mexico from 1934 to 
1940. For a thorough account of that period, see Cordova, 1973. 
3
 This intellectual movement has been analysed by Krauze, 
1971, and Cordova, 1973. One of the main representatives of 
this movement was Andrés Molina Enriquez. 
4
 For the main arguments on the conservative role of the hacien-
das in Mexico, see Orozco, 1895. 
of itself create a social class capable of attaining the 
golden prize of modernity: the entrepreneurial farmer. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the views of 
this intellectual movement was the emphasis placed on 
the role of the State as the social actor par excellence, 
both for politically reorganizing Mexican society and 
for promoting its economic development. Article 27 
of the Constitution which emerged from the 1917 
Constituent Congress established the State as the 
creator of property -thus going against the conven-
tional doctrine of natural law- in the sense that it laid 
down that the rights of ownership of land and water 
belong originally to the Nation, which "has had and 
has the right of transferring their control to private 
individuals, thus giving rise to private property", and 
that "the nation shall always have the right to impose 
on private property restrictions in the public interest". 
Even though the Constitution provides that the 
State is at all times the representative of the Nation, 
in practice by setting up a presidential regime it trans-
ferred to the Executive the representation of the na-
tion and thus the role of creator of private property. 
Article 27 recognized three forms of rural prop-
erty ownership: small private property, communal 
property and ejido property, with differential treat-
ment for ejido and communal property. Rightly not-
ing the damage caused during the period of liberal 
reform in the latter half of the nineteenth century to 
the indigenous communities by the application of the 
concept that all citizens Have equal legal capacity, it 
attempted to indemnify them by providing that all 
matters relating to land distribution or restitution or 
the settlement of disputes with the indigenous peo-
ples should be solved in administrative courts and not 
the conventional judicial courts "so that they could 
act at their discretion, appraising the special circum-
stances that might arise as a result of the lack of 
capacity of the indigenous peoples. Otherwise, the 
administrative courts, which are administrative be-
cause they have to have discretionary powers, would 
be reduced by one or other legal means to becoming 
courts of law in the strict sense of the term, making 
BETWEEN POLITICAL CONTROL AND EFRCIENCY GAINS: THE EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN MEXICO • GUSTAVO GORDILLO, ALAIN DE JANVRY AND ELISABETH SADOULET 
C E P A L R E V I E W 66 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 8 153 
them useless [for the purpose of land distribution]. It 
may be said that under those conditions no land allo-
cation or restitution can take place because it will be 
blocked and defeated by the skill and the resources of 
the landowner" (García Treviño, 1956, p. 51). Fur-
thermore, in order that there should be no doubt on 
this differential treatment between the ejido and the 
community on the one side and private property on 
the other, Andrés Molina Enríquez, the father of 
Mexican agrarian reform, argued several years later 
that "the distinguished members of the Querétaro 
Constituent Assembly bore in mind that both the 
communities themselves, in order to challenge the 
large landowners, and the labourers, in order to chal-
lenge the industrial entrepreneurs, were in such an 
inferior condition that it was indispensable for the 
government to act on their behalf in order to balance 
the forces on both sides and ensure full justice, play-
ing the same role in both cases as a public prosecutor 
or state attorney in all matters in which minors are 
parties to the dispute".5 This creates a "tutelage" rela-
tionship between the State and the peasants, who are 
considered to have a similar legal status to children or 
minors. 
Without challenging the basic principle underly-
ing the constitutional rules referring to the tutelage 
role of the State in respect of the peasants, the 
Cardenista school of thought introduced two major 
changes into government policy: the role of agrarian 
reform as an instrument of social stability, and the 
role of the ejido as a permanent institution. This 
policy was based on two assumptions: that it was no 
longer possible to delay resolving the basic demand 
of the peasant movement -namely, access to land-
because of the risk that the mass movement might 
spill over beyond the institutional framework,6 and 
secondly, that the ejido must become the hub of 
government rural policy.7 
The ejido, which until then had been seen as an 
instrument for containing the demands of the peasant 
masses, took on new features (which were to be 
maintained until 1991),8 as the result of a two-fold 
5
 Cited in Cordova, 1974, pp. 339-340. 
6
 Indeed, many regional peasant leagues were accusing the new 
governing elite of betraying the main goals of the Mexican revo-
lution. 
7
 Castillo, 1956, pp. 5-164, provides a pioneering interpretation 
of the problem of the Mexican ejido. 
8
 The constitutional reform of article 27 and the New Agrarian 
Law were passed through Congress and promulgated between 
November 1991 and February 1992 under President Salinas. 
linkage: between the ejido and the State (and more 
particularly with government agencies), and between 
the ejido and its members, the ejidatarios, who are the 
partners in that production unit. 
For the Cárdenas regime, the ejido was required 
to play a two-fold economic task: to supply cheap 
food and raw materials, and to boost the domestic 
market through the demand generated by the land-
owning peasants themselves. But for Cardenism 
these economic functions could only be properly per-
formed if the ejido was linked to the government 
agencies. Consequently, a wide-ranging multi-tiered 
pyramidal arrangement was set up, linking the ejido 
through its management -the ejido Executive Com-
mittees and the Supervisory Council-9 with agrarian 
leagues and through them to the national-level Con-
federación Nacional Campesina (CNC) (National 
Peasant Confederation). 
Even though the final phase of this organiza-
tional process culminated with a Presidential decree 
setting up the CNC and making it compulsory for all 
ejido members to belong to this organization, it 
would nevertheless be wrong to attribute its forma-
tion exclusively to a government decision. Before the 
foundation of the CNC there was a long period of 
peasant protests and organizational experiments on a 
regional basis which frequently led to the formation 
of state agrarian leagues and supraregional peasant 
representation bodies, such as the Liga Nacional 
Campesina (National Peasant League) ruled by 
Ursulo Galván from Veracruz in the early 1930s. 
Consequently, in the formation of the CNC the pres-
sure from below stemming from the peasant protests 
converged with the central government's decision 
to consolidate its hegemony in the rural sector. 
State tutelage over the peasants was not ex-
hausted with the formation of the CNC, however. On 
the contrary, that body was only one of a number of 
institutions set up or strengthened during the Carde-
nas regime with the express intention of supporting 
the development of the ejido and guaranteeing State 
hegemony. The agrarian law reforms in 1934 and 
1935 gave the Agrarian Reform Department (Depar-
tamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización) an 
enormous range of discretionary powers to protect 
and supervise the development of the ejidos and the 
communities, and above all to regulate access to the 
land. The formation of collective ejidos in the 
9
 These issues are discussed at length in Gordillo, 1998b. 
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irrigated areas that had been expropriated from the 
large estate owners gave rise to a number of govern-
ment rural development agencies, of which the most 
important was the Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal 
(the National Ejido Credit Bank). Although these in-
stitutions were very frequently referred to as being 
created to support and serve the ejido until it was 
wholly sustainable, both in practice and in the eyes 
and intentions of the political managers of these 
bodies the aim was to maintain permanent govern-
mental intervention in the production, regulation and 
supply of agricultural output, particularly of the 
staple commodities. 
Among all these institutions linked to the coun-
tryside, an initial division of labour very quickly took 
place: the CNC was responsible for channelling the 
peasant demands, particularly for land allocation, 
while the government agencies were responsible for 
regulating and settling those demands, particularly 
those relating to the organization of ejido production. 
As already noted, the policies which eventually 
fashioned Mexican agrarian law therefore shared two 
ideas: that the State must protect the interests of the 
peasants as a means of guaranteeing social equilib-
rium, and that this protection or tutelage should be 
only temporary. 
The solution to the dilemma raised by the prac-
tice of treating the peasantry as legal minors, which 
became necessary at the end of the 1940s when the 
institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution took 
place, was a hybrid formula first set out in the Bill 
tabled by President Calles in 1925, but whose most 
clear-sighted exponent was a former member of the 
Zapata army. It may be summarized as a combination 
of common property with private appropriation (usus 
fructus).10 The argument of the Zapatista Soto y 
Gama was as follows: "Property belongs in common 
to the community. Why? Because it is the community 
which is entitled to dispose of a plot of land when, 
for example, the ejido member dies. Why? Because 
the community has the right to impose regulations on 
this ownership, or rather on its use. Usufruct is there-
fore private, because the plot is given so that all of its 
products can be enjoyed, the whole of its harvest, by 
the person receiving it. But is this private property 
viewed under Roman law, property typical of the 
capitalist? Obviously not. Can he dispose of that plot 
of land? No. Can he mortgage it? No. Neither can he 
This expression comes from Cordova, 1974, p. 339. 
alienate it or break it up. In other words he does not 
possess the third of the characteristic rights of the full 
notion of ownership: he has right of use, right to the 
fruits, right to usufruct or beneficial use (usus fruc-
tus) but no more than that. He does not have the right 
to dispose or misuse. He receives the land as a social 
function but does not have the right to abuse it. And 
the worst abuse that one can inflict on the land is not 
to work it" (Cordova, 1974, pp. 339-340). 
The more moderate school of thought retained 
the ideal of private property as the final outcome of 
the ejido, and in order to make this happen some of 
the land allotted to the ejidos was split up into par-
cels, which originally should have not more than 
twenty hectares. In keeping with the ideas of the 
more radical school, an important role continued to 
be assigned to communal traditions, and thus a key 
component of each ejido was to be its communal 
area. Most importantly, however, the strategic vision 
that finally prevailed in the next three decades was 
the moderate one which saw agrarian reform and the 
ejido system basically as a political mechanism to 
ensure stability in the countryside. The role of the 
ejido as a production unit was completely neglected, 
and the function of supplying food was to be given to 
private agriculture. 
However, this hybrid formula bears within it a 
two-fold contradiction which was to emerge con-
stantly and which to a very large extent has created 
the conditions for today's peasant unrest. On the one 
hand, there is a contradiction with regard to the right 
of ownership which may be described in the follow-
ing terms: the right to private enjoyment may mean 
-and this is what it has in fact meant- a growing 
erosion of common ownership to the extent that it 
gives certain members of the ejido community 
greater access to the economic and political resources 
which enable them to develop private capital accu-
mulation processes. But in the same way the right to 
common ownership may mean -and has meant in 
reality- that private enjoyment may be prevented due 
to social inertia which immobilizes the production 
potential of all the commonly owned land.11 
Furthermore, there is a second contradiction be-
tween the right of ownership and the right of farmers 
to organize themselves (Castillo, 1956). In the final 
This contradiction regarding common lands is worthy of spe-
cial attention because 67% of all the land distributed to the 
ejidos is common land. See de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet, 
1997. 
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analysis, the legal ownership of the land is deposited 
in the State as the representative of the nation. But in 
the presidential system it is deposited in the Presi-
dent. This is further strengthened by a wide range of 
government agencies which intervene in the ejido 
production cycle. To the extent that this has weak-
ened the ejido as a body of representation, it has mu-
tilated or eroded the capacities of the rural 
communities to organize themselves to protect their 
own interests. 
Both these contradictions have affected the inter-
nal operation of the ejido and particularly what we 
might call its polyarchic system. From the very be-
ginning, two joint decision-making bodies were es-
tablished: the Ejido Executive Committee, made up 
of a president, a secretary, a treasurer and three com-
mittee members, together with a Supervisory Council 
also made up of six people, but also the Ejido 
General Assembly, which was to meet at least once a 
month in order to define the general policies of the 
ejido and resolve internal disputes. The democratic 
principle of minorities and majorities was established 
and (until the statutory reforms in 1983) the Supervi-
sory Council was automatically made up of candi-
dates from the electoral list which came second in the 
Ejido Executive Committee elections. Direct and uni-
versal suffrage was instituted, so that the elections to 
appoint the leadership were based on a list of ejido 
In the years following the Cárdenas regime, a devel-
opment model became established which encouraged 
a rapid process of industrialization, exploiting the 
situation that had been created in the wake of the 
Second World War. The typical conflict between the 
agricultural and agro-exporfing elites and the newly 
emerging industrial elites which blocked agrarian re-
form efforts in other Latin American countries 
emerged in Mexico only after the bulk of land reform 
had already occurred. Thus, the strategy of "no ex-
propriation provided there is modernization",13 which 
was so successful in the 1960s and 1970s in the rest 
of Latin America, took a slightly different form in 
Mexico in the 1940s. In the political arrangement 
reached in the second half of the 1940s between the 
members with full rights (the electoral register) and 
the voting was direct, secret and personal. Rules of 
procedure were also drawn up to codify the proce-
dures to be followed in decision-making and imple-
mentation and in the application of penalties, the 
sharing of profits, etc. The ejido leaders could stand 
for re-election, but they must receive the votes of 
three-quarters of the ejido members in order to be 
elected for a second term immediately following their 
period of office. 
All these rights and powers which enabled the 
ejido members to organize themselves freely, making 
the ejido an organ which directly represented the 
peasants, were severely distorted by the dual contra-
diction embedded in the hybrid formula that was 
finally imposed, however. 
To put it another way, as a body representing the 
peasants, the ejido is bound to be in a permanent state 
of tension with the ejido's quality of also being a 
State apparatus. This inevitable tension was ex-
pressed in the elective structure which determined the 
way in which the conflicts and struggles in the coun-
tryside were to be expressed.12 As a result of these 
struggles, the role of the ejido was strengthened both 
as an organ representing the peasants and as a State 
apparatus, but neither of these two aspects disap-
peared completely until the 1991 changes in article 
27 of the Constitution. 
various dominant elites, commercial private agricul-
ture was given the main responsibility of supplying 
food to the urban centres whose growth was obvi-
ously being spurred by the incipient industrialization 
process. But the ejido agriculture -that is to say, the 
reformed sector- was there to stay, however precari-
ous its existence was to be in the years to come. 
Under these assumptions -especially the irre-
versibility of land reform, albeit in fact blocked from 
12
 See Prseworski, 1985, especially p. 73: "The assertion that 
social relations structure class struggles must not be interpreted 
in a mechanical fashion. Social relations ... are a structure of 
choices given at a particular moment of history". 
13
 See de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989. 
II 
Loyalties and free-riders (1940-1970) 
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then on- the "no expropriation if modernization" 
strategy functioned as elsewhere by "inducing the 
State to reallocate the land reform budget and redi-
rect the attention of land reform agencies to the pur-
suit of modernization in medium and large farms" (de 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989, p. 1406). 
1. Survival and transformation 
Perhaps one of the most fascinating features that is 
noted when analysing this period has to do with the 
survival of the ejido itself. Why was it that -if the 
ejido, which had become a pool of cheap labour, was 
exploited and systematically decapitalized without 
bringing any real benefits to its members- the ejido 
members themselves did not give rise to an internal 
movement contesting the very concept of the ejido? 
And if the government was promoting different 
measures that tended to disintegrate the ejido and 
give pride of place to private farm ownership, why 
was it that it did not complete its work in this re-
spect? 
This second question could be answered prag-
matically, by asserting that the State did not com-
pletely destroy the ejido system because it worked 
extremely well in the current circumstances, both for 
the purposes of rural accumulation and political con-
trol. But this is an ex post response to an ex ante 
phenomenon. Unless the State is viewed as an entity 
endowed with absolute rationality, this response takes 
no account of the reasons why, when faced with the 
unstoppable wave of rejection of populist policies 
which invaded the top levels of government from the 
late 1940s up to 1970, decisions were not taken to 
end the transitional period that the existence of the 
ejido presupposed.14 
As far as the first question is concerned, the an-
swer might be that this did not happen because of the 
institutional barriers to changing the legal system 
without losing access to the land. But this decision by 
the ejido members not to abandon the ejido must be 
qualified, depending on what we mean by "abandon", 
Secondly, we must take account of the other key ele-
ment which Hirschman (1977, pp. 78-104) intro-
duces, namely loyalty -present and past- as a 
mechanism which strengthens continued membership 
of organizations under certain circumstances. 
14
 A well-documented study on this wave of rejection of popu-
list policies is given in Torres and Medina, 1978, 1979a and 
1979b, passim. 
Abandoning the ejido, in the strict sense of the 
term, would have meant giving up the ejido parcel 
land and, more broadly speaking, losing membership 
in the ejido. In the period in question there were a 
number of circumstances which would have made 
this attractive, such as the higher wages that could be 
earned in more dynamic agricultural regions or in the 
cities, or emigration to the United States. Further-
more, in many rural areas of Mexico the emergence 
and consolidation of petty caciques or local bosses 
which occurred in this period generated forms of co-
existence which were so unpleasant that this alone 
would probably have been enough to offset the un-
certainties of moving to another rural area or to the 
large towns. This is not to say that this did not occur. 
Both in the more dynamic poles of agriculture and in 
the large urban centres there is strong evidence of 
migration flows from the ejidos during those years.15 
But this migration, when it became permanent, usu-
ally meant the migration of a part of the household, 
but not of the member of the family in whom the 
agrarian rights in the ejido were vested (or when it 
did include him, he had already negotiated an agree-
ment with the ejido authorities which generally im-
plied leasing or lending his parcel for a period of time 
without losing it altogether). Thus, these migrations 
did not lead to a break with the ejido. It may be 
assumed that this was so because this first generation 
of ejido members were in a similar situation to that 
described by Hirschman: expensive entry into the or-
ganization, blind loyalty, and institutional barriers to 
leaving (Hirschman, 1977). The cost of entry was 
high because usually most of the ejido members had 
been struggling for many years, at the cost of great 
sacrifices and even exposing their own lives, in order 
to gain access to the land. The type of loyalty which 
they showed towards the ejido, which they recog-
nized as the natural body to represent them, was 
strongly influenced by past history, in which the es-
tablishment of the ejido was only achieved after 
countless battles, and the operation of the ejido itself 
was strongly marked by the peasant movement. 
Obviously, the institutional barriers do not stem 
from the difficulty of giving up the ejido, but rather 
from the difficulty of giving it up while retaining 
ownership of the parcel and, to a certain extent, re-
taining membership of the ejido. It is symptomatic 
Paré (1977) deals mainly with migration from one rural area 
to another. For their part, Astorga (1985) and Arispe Schloesser 
(1985) provide interesting interpretations of rural migration. 
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that in the offensive against the collective ejidos in 
the 1940s, their dismantling led to the breakup of the 
collective forms of working the land, but not to the 
disappearance of the ejido. To sum up, access to the 
ejido parcel and to membership of the ejido were of 
crucial importance for the titular ejido members as an 
"insurance policy". 
This explanation brings in another element: loy-
alty and institutional barriers combine both to prevent 
people from leaving the ejido and from using their 
"voice", which in this case could have taken the form 
of fighting the ejido bosses. What happened, then, 
was a form of silent protest which was expressed 
both through migration and through failure to partici-
pate in the ejido assemblies. Incidentally, it would 
appear that the rural areas with the greatest social 
conflict at this time were those where collectivized 
agriculture was being dismantled. 
This interpretation leads us to give a provisional 
answer to the second question as well. For the politi-
cal elite of the time, who were promoting industriali-
zation, it was obvious that the agricultural support for 
this process had to come from private agriculture. 
This is shown by the fact that virtually all State poli-
cies were designed to encourage this. But the con-
struction of the institutional framework for sustaining 
this change in agricultural policies in favour of the 
private sector was quite a long-term process, because 
in the short term the governmental agencies were 
deeply involved in either actively supporting the 
ejido system or at least paying lip service to it, and 
furthermore there was resistance and even conflict 
within them regarding this change of direction.16 
Moreover, commercial agriculture did not auto-
matically respond to the promptings of the State, 
above all following the trauma of the expropriations 
under Cárdenas, and the weight of ejido production, 
particularly in basic staples, was still considerable. 
Lastly, everyone could clearly see that the State had 
been buying social peace for many years in the coun-
tryside thanks to agrarian reform. In addition to this 
was the fact that the emergence of the caciques, the 
internal breakup of the ejidos and the marginal posi-
tion to which the ejido had been relegated in terms of 
16
 A typical example of this was the conflict over the basic 
thrust of agricultural research in Mexico between the Special 
Studies Office of the Mexican Department of Agriculture, which 
operated under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation, and 
the Agricultural Research Institute which also came under the 
Department of Agriculture but was influenced by the members 
of the League of Socialist Agronomists. 
public policies had not caused serious social upheav-
als, so that no further steps were taken towards dis-
mantling the ejido system. In a sense, the preservation 
of the status quo was a result of the success achieved 
in the agricultural sector as a whole.17 
To sum up this important point: the ejido was not 
privatized because on the peasants' side it was a cru-
cial "insurance policy" that facilitated multipurpose 
activities and on the government side it was a vital 
political apparatus for maintaining stability in the 
countryside while allowing private commercial agri-
culture to be the main provider of food. 
2. Social mobilization for gaining access to land 
In the late 1960s, a number of events were to occur 
which changed this context and to a large extent de-
fined the trends of the new wave of peasant mobiliza-
tions. 
As commercial agriculture concentrated on lu-
crative crops, both for export and as inputs for the 
agri-food complex, giving up the production of cere-
als, it became urgently necessary to redirect the ejido 
system towards the production of staple foodstuffs 
and emphasize its role as a production unit, which, as 
already noted, had been neglected since the 1940s. 
This change in the cropping pattern was of course 
due to changes in the international division of labour 
and the presence of transnational food corporations at 
the end of the 1950s, but it was also furthered by the 
general policies of the government, which needed 
foreign currency to finance the import substitution 
process. 
There were also other phenomena inherent in the 
type of rural development that these changes were 
bringing about. The source of these changes must be 
traced back to the time when State incentives for sta-
ple foodstuff production were basically concentrated 
on private commercial agriculture, and its high prof-
its, based on increasing the physical volume of pro-
duction through increased yields and extension of 
cultivated land, were blocked by two factors: the 
capital needed to sustain increased yields (particu-
larly of staple crops) or to continue with large-scale 
17
 From the early 1940s up to the mid-1960s, agricultural and 
livestock production turned in a very dynamic performance. In 
fact, from 1946/48 up to 1964/66, total agricultural output grew 
by an average of 7.1% per year. Since at the same time the 
annual population growth rate was 3.2%, this gave a 3.8% an-
nual per capita increase. See Gordillo, 1990. 
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irrigation developments, and the resurgence of peas-
ant movements exerting direct pressure against the 
unlawful hoarding of land, which was the favourite 
way of extending the cultivated land under the con-
trol of private agriculture. 
As from 1965 there were increasing signs of a 
major crisis in the agricultural sector, the most evi-
dent symptoms being the reduction in the land under 
cultivation and a decline in the growth rate of maize 
production in the rain-fed zones. The combination of 
these two indicators strongly suggests that this agri-
cultural crisis was mainly within the ejido system.18 
This crisis was the result of the unbridled decapitali-
zation process to which ejido agriculture was sub-
jected, and the difficulties being faced by the internal 
migrants in search of jobs as a consequence both of 
the transition towards a new stage in the import sub-
stitution process on which agricultural development 
depended, and the increasing mechanization of com-
mercial agriculture. The ejido was in fact experienc-
ing a dual crisis: a production crisis and a social 
reproduction crisis. 
Commercial agriculture gradually gave up the 
production of cereals and tended to replace them with 
fodder crops and the soya-sorghum complex, along 
with the development of livestock raising, which took 
away extensive areas that had previously been de-
voted to cereals production. Because of the decapi-
talization process to which it was subjected, the ejido 
system could not fill this vacuum, and since between 
35% and 45% of all ejido households in those years 
were unable to derive even half of their income from 
on-farm activities, and were facing increasing diffi-
culties in finding off-farm incomes, the impossibility 
for the ejido as such to build up an accumulation fund 
of its own was coupled with the increasing difficul-
ties facing households in covering their own con-
sumption needs. The ejido system's response to all 
this was a reduction in production output, due both to 
the greater emphasis on self-consumption and to the 
reduction of the land under cultivation, which, as al-
ready noted, led to the agricultural crisis at the end of 
the 1960s. 
These same circumstances gave rise to another 
and apparently paradoxical phenomenon: because of 
the greater pressure on ejido agriculture, despite the 
difficulties in the off-ejido labour markets this situ-
18
 See the statistics given in the article by Gómez Olivier, 1978, 
pp, 714-727. 
ation gave rise to permanent migration flows, which 
were largely responsible for the explosive growth in 
the poverty belts around the large towns, the emer-
gence of peasant towns adjacent to the commercial 
agriculture zones, and the appearance of peasant 
ghettos in the large towns and cities (i.e., neighbour-
hoods or settlements inhabited by people from the 
same peasant region, who not only maintained their 
cultural and affective bonds with their communities 
but also established a permanent flow of economic 
assistance). As in the previous period, however, these 
migration flows that were now permanent presup-
posed that the legal bond with the ejido was main-
tained, and not broken. 
Another phenomenon was also beginning to 
emerge very noticeably: the generational takeover 
from the original ejido members, because it should be 
borne in mind that most of the original ejido mem-
bers received their lands between 1930 and 1940. 
Even though the land distribution did not stop, and 
between 1964 and 1970 it was actually stepped up,19 
the number of ejido members involved and the geo-
political location of the first ejidos made this genera-
tional takeover quite significant. 
The form that it now took was quite different 
from that observed in the case of the first generations 
of ejidatarios, but perhaps what was most important 
was the combination of: i) a process of fragmentation 
of the ejido parcel, giving access to land to the eldest 
son, albeit in a very unstable manner; ii) the forma-
tion of committees of applicants for land, made up 
basically of other sons of ejidatarios and neighbours, 
which asked the authorities to expand the original 
ejidos; and iii) permanent or temporary emigration of 
some of the other siblings, following a pattern in 
which part of the household went out to a particular 
19
 According to official figures, under the presidency of Diaz 
Ordaz, 24 million hectares were distributed, 16 million more 
than in the period of Cárdenas. The quality of the land distrib-
uted becomes very clear when one compares the number of 
ejido members benefitted in the two periods: under the presi-
dency of Diaz Ordaz, about 300,000 household heads received 
land, compared with just over 750,000 under Cárdenas. In the 
period from 1964 to 1970 the land distribution figures also in-
cluded land distributed in other periods but actually delivered 
during that period. A legal reform was also introduced which 
defined the land delivery procedure as being the allocation of 
land a great distance away from where the applicants originally 
lived ("nuevos centros de población"). The real intention was to 
relieve the pressure on the large estates of irrigated land, but in 
many cases the result was that the peasants declined to move to 
other regions, Nevertheless, the land was recorded as having 
been distributed. 
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migration area in advance of the others, settled down 
there and subsequently formed a base so that the 
other members of the household could join them later 
as temporary migrants. 
The 1960s were characterized by great instability 
in peasant households, not only as a result of migra-
tion but also because of a great many conflicts within 
households, between households, against the ejido 
caciques, etc., all basically due to the desire to gain 
access to an ejido parcel. 
Within the ejido, more and more people were 
clamouring for a change in the system. This repre-
sented a direct challenge to the bosses and a slow and 
sometimes underground process carried out through 
the formation of committees of applicants for land 
III 
The governmental response to this crisis was typical 
of political cycles in Mexico. For thirty years after 
the Cárdenas regime the policies he had implemented 
in the countryside were either flatly rejected as popu-
list or simply considered outdated policies of a his-
toric period which had now passed. But in 1970 the 
newly elected regime headed by Luis Echeverría 
badly needed new legitimation following the bloody 
repression of the student movement in 1968, and in 
addition it was confronted in the countryside with a 
new wave of peasant mobilization more widespread 
than any seen since the 1930s. Faced with new 
demands for land coming from the ejido members, 
and with incipient but clear signs of stagnation in 
agriculture and livestock production, the regime re-
sorted to the arsenal of Cardenist policies and meas-
ures, with the clear intention of revamping the social 
pact that had been of crucial importance in the 1940s. 
In order to do this, the Echeverría regime intro-
duced two major changes. Firstly, like the Cardenist 
school of thought, it again considered the ejido as the 
main hub of State intervention and as the basic pro-
duction unit for guaranteeing food production and 
self-sufficiency. The Agrarian Law, which had not 
undergone any major changes since 1946, was com-
pletely reformed, with the introduction of a new 
chapter regarding the "economic activities of the 
ejido". At the same time, a new set of institutions 
made up of the sons of ejido members and settlers on 
the ejidos. In one way or another the creation of these 
land-demand committees also created new ways of 
thinking, directly related to the operation of the eji-
dos, and activated the historical memory of the origi-
na! members. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the 
ejidos found that they were becoming enormously 
more influential in terms of the government's re-
sponse to their mobilisation -even though it was nor-
mally limited to their particular ejido- and their 
boycotts, which in this case took the form of refusal 
to work their land (Hirschman, 1977, pp. 86-87). 
All these processes led to a new wave of peasant 
protests, starting in the 1970s and still continuing to 
this day. 
were either created or given broader mandates to im-
plement the legal changes. No regime before, includ-
ing the Cárdenas regime, had engaged in such a 
broad range of interventions as those resulting from 
Echeverria's reforms. A new ministry (the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform) was set up in the 1970s, and the 
ministries of agriculture and of water resources were 
merged into a single powerful body. New para-State 
bodies were also created through various mergers to 
provide such services as rural credit, foodstuff distri-
bution, agro-industrial development, production and 
distribution of inputs, etc., thus greatly expanding the 
scope of State intervention. 
Secondly, the government sought to deal with 
the peasant mobilization -mainly conducted by 
grassroots groupings that were questioning the domi-
nant role of the official peasants' organizations- by 
trying to revitalize the corporative arrangements. Al-
though during the first year of the new regime cases 
of illegal occupation of land were severely punished, 
using army troops for the purpose, very soon the 
wide extension of the mobilizations forced the gov-
ernment to try controlling them by agreeing to use its 
discretionary powers to confiscate private land and 
distribute it to landless peasants. Indeed, by the end 
of the Echeverría regime major expropriations of 
land had been carried out in the irrigated districts 
where the best-quality land was to be found, and the 
The dynamics of political control (1970-1988) 
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distribution of land rose to one of the highest levels 
since the time of Cárdenas. This gave rise to a pro-
found political crisis, with both peasant organizations 
and private farmers dissatisfied with the govern-
ment's performance. 
But what was perhaps the most important feature 
of this period was the extent to which the system of 
political control was refined and extended to the re-
formed sector. After having analysed the ejido from a 
historical perspective -limited of course to the twen-
tieth century- we will now review the interaction 
amongst its different components, taking its role as 
an instrument of political control as the basic driving 
force. It is important to keep in mind that the State's 
shaping of the ejido into an instrument of political 
control happened slowly and unevenly across the 
country. Ejidos have always been highly diverse and 
heterogeneous. They differ not only in their natural 
resource endowments but also in their membership 
composition and the different trajectories of their 
struggles for land. While acknowledging this diver-
sity, however, it is still possible to analyse the model 
of political control that was applied to all ejidos. This 
model operated at three levels: the legal framework, 
political representation, and social reproduction. All 
these levels operated simultaneously but with varying 
intensities depending on the period and the region. 
While the government's organizations and the format 
of State intervention have thus differed, they have all 
been based on a model of control that was authoritar-
ian, hierarchical, yet inclusive. 
1. State intervention in ejido affairs 
There were specific legal codes that very strictly 
regulated the organization of production within the 
ejido and laid down the rights and obligations of the 
ejidatarios. For example, the ejidatarios had to work 
the land directly; they could not hire wage labour. 
They could not rent the land or sell it. Absences from 
the ejido of more than two years led to loss of right to 
the land. All ejidatarios had to establish the order of 
heirs to their land in writing, usually naming a spouse 
or partner as the preferred successor, Ejidatarios 
could vote for and be elected to the Executive Com-
mittee of the ejido's Assembly. They could also vote 
on the definition of an internal set of rules that regu-
lated their rights, particularly their access to the com-
munity's common lands. Each ejidatario also had the 
right to an urban lot on which to establish a residence 
and to a maximum of twenty hectares of land for 
direct cultivation. 
Access to land could be gained in any of four 
ways. For an indigenous community with legal docu-
mentation, access to the land was gained through the 
right of restitution. If a person lived in a human set-
tlement where land was available for distribution 
within a certain radius, he or she could obtain land 
through a grant. If an individual was willing to relo-
cate to another region or state, he or she could obtain 
land in colonization zones where new population 
centres were being promoted. Finally, existing ejidos 
could obtain an extension of their land and thus in-
corporate new ejidatarios.20 In the last decade before 
the recent reforms, the government allowed the incor-
poration of households whose members had the title 
of ejidatarios but had no land (ejidatarios con dere-
chos a salvo). 
A number of mechanisms existed through which 
the State intervened in the internal life of the ejidos 
to impose the law (Whetten, 1948; Fernández y 
Fernández, 1973): 
i) There was State intervention aimed at legaliz-
ing the ejidos' internal decision-making processes. 
For example, almost all important decisions were 
made in the ejido assembly: distribution of urban lots 
and plots for cultivation; approval of internal rules; 
requests for credit and other public services such as 
schools, running water systems, or roads; regulation 
of access to collectively used lands; arid definition of 
forms of work within the ejido. However, to make an 
assembly's decisions valid, a representative of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (SRA), formerly called 
the Agrarian Department, had to be present. Further-
more, calling an ejido assembly was only considered 
legal if a representative of the SRA or of the municipal 
authority endorsed it. Extraordinary assemblies could 
only be convened by the SRA. 
ii) The State intervened in ejido arbitration mat-
ters. For example, family controversies about the use 
of land plots or conflicts regarding inheritances had 
to be settled in State administrative tribunals. These 
tribunals were part of the structure of the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform and they also settled boundary dis-
putes between ejidos, between ejidos and private 
landowners, and between ejidos and indigenous com-
munities. 
20
 The legal names for these four processes are restitución, do-
tación, nuevos centros de población, and ampliación. 
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iii) The State controlled the flow of public re-
sources to the ejido. Since the late 1970s, commercial 
banks have made loans to ejido members, but before 
that time only official State banks offered this serv-
ice. In order for an ejidatario to receive credit, an 
official authorization from the ejido assembly was 
required. However, the credit was given to the ejido. 
Thus, all its members were co-liable for the total 
amount of credit received and had to offer their har-
vest as collateral. In order to secure this collateral, 
the official bank established agreements with the 
ejido, with each member who had received credit, 
and with the State organization that marketed the 
ejido's crops and livestock production. This market-
ing organization, CONASUPO (the National Basic 
Foods Company), bought the harvest at an estab-
lished guaranteed price and issued cheques to the eji-
datarios and the official bank. Part of the credit was 
paid in kind. If the credit was for fertilizers, FER-
TIMEX, the para-State organization for the production 
and distribution of fertilizers, was responsible for re-
payment. If the credit was for insecticides, other 
chemical products, or machinery, the bank estab-
lished contractual arrangements with the respective 
private enterprises. In the irrigation districts, an irri-
gation permit was also required. This permit was is-
sued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources (SARH), previously called the Ministry of 
Water Resources and, before that, the National Irriga-
tion Commission (Gordillo, 1988b). 
Until very recendy, all borrowers from the offi-
cial bank were required to purchase crop insurance 
from an official institution. There were also State en-
terprises that operated all along the commercial chain 
in coffee, cocoa, sugar cane, tropical fruits, and other 
specialized crops. These para-State bodies provided 
credit, purchased the harvest, and supplied technical 
assistance and inputs as well. In every case, an ejido 
assembly was required to agree on the ejido's partici-
pation in the programme. Overwhelmed by so many 
State requirements, the ejido assemblies could at best 
only discuss policies initiated by the government, 
stifling initiatives that could have emerged from the 
ejidatarios themselves. 
iv) The State also intervened in a wide range of 
social welfare and infrastructure services. The Minis-
try of Education established schools and provided 
teachers. Public organizations for health, housing, 
food aid, roads, ethnic issues and recreational activi-
ties also intervened. This extensive State intervention 
in social services was focused in particular on the 
indigenous communities and poorest ejidos, which 
contributed to the development of a functional distri-
bution of government agencies across ejidos and a 
deepening of heterogeneity in the rural sector: while 
the social development agencies concentrated on 
meeting the needs of poor ejidos and indigenous 
communities, the agencies promoting production at-
tended to the demands of private producers and the 
more prosperous ejidos. 
2. Political representation 
At another level, the political control model operated 
through different forms of political representation in 
the ejido, with pervasive political interventions. Until 
the mid-1980s, with a few exceptions during the 
1950s and 1960s,21 in order to gain access to public 
goods and services, ejidatarios must belong to the 
National Peasants' Confederation (CNC), which in 
turn was affiliated with the ruling Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI). Thus, through decisions of the 
ejido assembly or more frequently of the ejido's ex-
ecutive committee, the ejidatarios were made mem-
bers of both the CNC and the PRI. It is worth 
emphasizing, however, that although the model of 
political control was authoritarian, it was also inclu-
sive. In other words, it did not aim at excluding the 
rural social actors but rather at incorporating them 
into rural governance. The State accomplished this 
through different levels of peasant organizations. 
The first level comprised the corporative organi-
zations, which were given preferential treatment by 
the State. At first these organizations were eminently 
political, because of the links connecting the ejido 
executive committees with the regional committees, 
the state leagues, and the CNC. During the 1970s, 
however, as a consequence of the first substantive 
modification of the agrarian law in almost thirty 
21
 During those years, two major splits occurred in the uncon-
tested political monopoly of the CNC. These splits gave birth to 
four organizations: the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos 
de México (UG0CM), the Central Campesina Independiente 
(CCI), the Consejo Agrario Mexicano (CAM), and the Central 
Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (ClOAC). The 
first three organizations were subsequently incorporated in the 
official political party (PRI), but CIOAC has always been loosely 
linked to leftist parties. 
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years,22 the economic organization of the ejido came 
to be the favoured form of corporative organization. 
That is why, in the 1970s, the first ejido unions and 
Rural Collective Interest Associations (ARics) were 
formed. Since all forms of economic organization 
had to stem from government.initiatives and were 
used to facilitate the implementation of government 
programmes, major efforts were made to include the 
rural population through this mechanism. New forms 
of organizations were established to incorporate 
new social groups. For example, the UAlMs (Agro-
Industrial Units for Women) were also created in that 
decade. During the 1980s, youth organizations, Com-
munity Committees for the Distribution of Foodstuffs 
(Consejos Comunitarios de Abasto), and specialized 
organizations for specific products were created 
(among other organizations) within the ejidos. When-
ever there was an important new national objective, a 
new widespread demand in the countryside, or a fa-
vourite programme of the current President, new or-
ganizations were established. Even though this was 
not the original purpose, the creation of these organi-
zations increased the negotiating capacity of the ejido, 
giving rise to a new generation of peasant leaders. 
The second level of peasant organization was 
based on traditional community organizations, which 
had been present since time immemorial. They were 
grounded on reciprocity, with organizations for mu-
tual insurance, collective labour, and labour ex-
change. In most ejidos, these organizations adapted to 
changing circumstances but they never disappeared. 
Since the official criterion to determine whether peas-
ants were organized or not was the number of formal 
organizations that existed, these community organiza-
tions were not considered and it was always assumed 
that peasants were not organized. 
The third level of peasant organization consisted 
of entities that had previously existed only on paper 
-because they had been artificially created by the 
government- but were transformed into repre-
sentative organizations. The process whereby exist-
ing formal and informal community institutions 
-ejido unions, Rural Collective Interest Associations, 
cooperatives, etc.- were converted into representative 
organizations was a result of mobilizations on behalf 
of ad hoc causes. 
22
 A new agrarian law was promulgated during the presidency of 
Luis Echeverría (1970-1976). 
The coexistence of these different levels of 
peasant organization was largely the result of a non-
intentional separation of functions. Corporative or-
ganizations established the links between the State 
and peasants, while community organizations estab-
lished relationships of solidarity among members of 
the community, and representative organizations 
emerged when traditional channels for posing de-
mands failed to work. 
3. Secondary markets as a source of social 
reproduction 
No model of political control is perfect, especially in 
the absence of a pre-established plan. Because the 
model evolved as it was being implemented, many 
aspects emerged randomly. Several elements of the 
model contradicted each other, and the instruments of 
control varied from one Presidency to the next. There 
were, however, two features of the model that did not 
vary. Its inclusive nature was maintained, which 
means that, rather than excluding new social agents 
or possible dissidents, the State usually tried to co-
opt each group under the existing rules, and there 
was a strong agrarian ideology, which helped to 
hold the structure of the ejido together. This ideology 
was organized around two basic themes: i) the alli-
ance between the peasants and the State, with the 
supposed objective of assuring the progress of the 
former, and ii) the need to resort to State agents as 
intermediaries between peasants and the rest of na-
tional society. 
However, it seems to be a feature of all societies 
that every State intervention in political or economic 
markets -particularly interventions sustained over a 
long period of time- creates countervailing responses 
and secondary markets. The model of State control 
over the ejidos was no exception. For example, the 
prohibition against selling ejido land created a secon-
dary market (Warman, 1980; Gledhill, 1991). Wid-
ows and ejidatarios who had migrated for good were 
the primary participants in land sales, while sales of 
surplus lands or part of an ejidatario's land to resolve 
severe economic crises were the primary sources. The 
prohibition against renting land created an even more 
active illegal market, especially in irrigated areas. 
From the ejidatarios' point of view, the temporary 
rental of a plot of land was a means of economic 
recovery in case of hardship. Frequently the illegal 
rental of ejido land was related to migration (De 
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Walt, 1979). In some cases, the rightful ejidatario mi-
grated for an extended period of time and rented the 
land to circumvent the rule that prohibited him/her 
from leaving the ejido for more than two years. In 
other cases, an old ejidatario or his widow rented the 
land because they had no children to help work it. 
Alternatively, wage labour was hired to replace the 
labour of family members who had migrated. The 
ejido assembly, which had to be held monthly in the 
presence of a government official, was frequently 
conducted without the official's presence, although 
the latter nevertheless established his presence ex 
post facto in order to obtain favours and perquisites. 
Sometimes assemblies that had never taken place 
were invented, with the connivance of the govern-
ment representative. Credit, insurance, roads, and 
schools could be obtained in this way, and this 
method also served to expel ejido members, incorpo-
rate new ejidatarios, and dismiss ejido Executive 
Committee members. 
The secondary markets generated their own po-
litical and economic agents: the ejido bosses. Since 
all black markets break the law, it was necessary for 
these agents to legalize their offences. For example, 
selling a plot of land was legalized through a process 
of elimination of ejidatarios and new assignments 
(depuración y nuevas adjudicaciones). The seller of 
the plot ceased to be an ejidatario at the time of sale, 
adducing any legal reason that would suffice, while 
the buyer was incorporated as a new ejidatario. Also, 
a member of the ejido who left for more than two 
years could be excused from working the land for 
"health reasons". Without such mechanisms, many of 
the peasant leaders who had stayed away from the 
ejido for twenty years or more would have lost their 
land. Sometimes an ejidatario would not leave offi-
cially but would "lend [his land] without compensa-
tion" to the ejido executive committee or to a person 
authorized by the committee, although in fact he did 
so in exchange for money. The same system was used 
for renting land. To cover up an ejidatario's absence, 
his name would always appear on the list of those 
present at the ejido assemblies. Furthermore, the eji-
datario was on the credit list of the official bank and 
even on the list of those taking out insurance with the 
State firm. To compensate tenants for the shortness of 
the rental period (which was necessary because of the 
illegality of the transaction), the ejidatarios who 
rented their land also allowed their respective tenants 
to use their names. In this way the tenants gained 
access to official credit, which was subsidized. Some 
private landowners in northeastern Mexico went so 
far as to rent not only ejido parcels but even entire 
ejidos. 
Some of the secondary markets that emerged 
from State interventions in economic matters became 
highly lucrative businesses. For example, the "disas-
ter business" consisted of feigning damage to the har-
vest and collecting the crop insurance. In order for 
this to work, the cooperation of an ejido executive 
committee member was necessary, because he or she 
was the first to be notified of the "disaster". The co-
operation of representatives of the Ministries of 
Agrarian Reform and of Agriculture and Water Re-
sources was also necessary, because they were re-
sponsible for verifying the supposed disaster. 
Insurance company agents, official bank repre-
sentatives, and of course the ejidatario himself all 
cooperated in confirming the "disaster" too. The eji-
datario collected the insurance for the "damaged" 
harvest and then sold the same harvest through regu-
lar market channels. For the ejidatario, this was a way 
of counterbalancing the low guaranteed prices or sim-
ply making a little extra money. And what did the 
other participants in the deal gain? This is where the 
official bank agent came in. Credit had been given to 
the ejidatario in installments. The last installment 
paid out before the disaster claim was filed was en-
dorsed over to the official bank agent, who then col-
lected the money and distributed it to the whole chain 
of collaborators in this peculiar business (Relio, 1987). 
In short, the reproduction of the ejido was sup-
ported by secondary or "black" markets. These 
played an important role in adapting State political 
and legal interventions to the logic of peasant society 
and economy. This interaction between two different 
and frequently contradictory logics affected the way 
both of them functioned, making them compatible, if 
not convergent. But of course the efficiency and 
equity costs were enormous, both in resource wast-
age, in public budget deficits, and in the welfare 
levels of the ejidatarios. 
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IV 
Reforming agrarian reform (1982-1994) 
1. The convergence of opposites 
The reforms in the countryside that were imple-
mented during President Salinas's regime (1988-
1994) addressed two basic areas: the relationship 
between rural producers and the State, and the rela-
tionship among productive agents in the countryside 
(Gordillo, 1992). 
During the last twenty years, peasants success-
fully developed mechanisms of resistance to the im-
plementation of public policies in rural areas. The 
State, with its instruments of intervention and con-
trol, was increasingly seen as an enemy by the differ-
ent social agents in rural areas. Frequently, economic 
problems became politicized and stirred up confron-
tations that had paradoxical effects. The very same 
State policies that suffocated the ejidos also increased 
the latter's demands for more State support. 
As a result of the debt crisis of 1982 and the 
subsequent implementation of stabilization and ad-
justment policies, a rural development strategy based 
on the pervasive presence of the State ceased to be 
economically viable. The State had intervened 
through very diverse means, including selective indi-
rect subsidies, which were usually regressive. This 
strategy was very costly for the State because it 
depended on the massive disbursement of subsi-
dies, and the model soon became highly ineffi-
cient. Subsidies were channelled not only to the ejido 
sector but also, and indeed mainly, to the private sec-
tor in agriculture. These subsidies had different pur-
poses: for the ejido sector, they were intended to 
grease the machinery of political control; for the pri-
vate sector, they sought to stimulate production. It 
was the private sector that was assigned the classical 
role of agriculture in an import substitution model, 
providing foreign exchange and cheap food. The 
model of political control became inefficient because 
it had been developed for a closed society organized 
into corporative segments. The winds of political 
mobilization, which started to blow strongly in 
Mexico after the student movement of 1968, began 
to erode this authoritarian model, and the State's le-
gitimacy came to depend increasingly on electoral 
processes and greater political openness. At the same 
time, the 1982 debt crisis also helped to shatter the 
economic model that had prevailed in Mexico since 
the 1950s. 
Consequently, political control and economic 
subsidies decreased, creating an exceptional opportu-
nity for convergence between free-market macroe-
conomic policies and social mobilization. Economic 
policy -which focussed mainly on trade liberaliza-
tion, deregulation and privatization- converged with 
social mobilization objectives, which focussed on re-
structuring peasant representation through political 
liberalization, in rejecting State intervention. This 
convergence was neither premeditated nor deliber-
ately promoted by government or civil society. On 
the contrary, economic liberalization was to be ac-
complished by modifying and using political authori-
tarianism, not abolishing it. Similarly, the strategy of 
political liberalization -and in some cases democrati-
zation- was meant to preserve the economic privi-
leges gained through State subsidies. 
How did these two opposing tendencies come 
to converge? There was never an articulated policy 
combining both strategies. Rather, what happened 
was that the juxtaposition of policies had created 
an institutional vacuum. The political control 
model depended on State intervention. However, 
the State enterprises responsible for this interven-
tion were largely privatized, and their control loos-
ened when they found themselves in financial 
crisis. The political clientele supported by these en-
terprises prevented their complete privatization, 
and many State enterprise assets were instead 
transferred to rural producers. For example, the ba-
sic instruments of political control in the country-
side were affected when BANRURAL (National 
Rural Credit Bank) ran into financial difficulties 
and land distribution ceased. However, peasant re-
sistance prevented the complete disappearance of the 
official bank and led to the emergence of alterna-
tive mechanisms such as the credit without collat-
eral provided by the National Solidarity 
Programme (PRONASOL), and, more recently, the es-
tablishment of credit unions. Peasant resistance also 
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prevented the total cancellation of land distribution 
and obtained a promise to negotiate about lands still 
in the process of allocation. This very particular con-
vergence helped to remove obstacles, but it did not 
lead to the creation of new institutions. 
The economic reforms sought to abandon the 
system of guaranteed prices and align internal prices 
with international ones. But the juxtaposition of the 
two currents, economic and political liberalization, 
caused two crucial problems. First, the system of 
guaranteed prices, which had covered twelve prod-
ucts, disappeared, but guaranteed prices were main-
tained for maize and beans. No reasonable 
adjustment scheme was ever prepared for smoothing 
the process of price alignment and trade openness, 
which dramatically changed the marketing of agricul-
tural products and increased peasant indebtedness. At 
the same time, maintaining guaranteed prices for 
maize and beans generated extraordinary rents for 
some producers. The agricultural sector turned en 
masse to maize production, and agriculture evolved 
toward monoculture instead of diversification. 
The reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Con-
stitution in 1991-1992 helped to further dismantle 
the political control model. The promoters of eco-
nomic liberalism saw this reform as a way to free 
the ejido 's production potential and create a market 
for land. To implement their plans (especially the 
more unpopular measures) they counted on the ef-
fectiveness of the political control model. The pro-
moters of political liberalism, on the other hand, 
saw the reform as dismantling the political control 
model but not the system of economic rewards that 
it provided. Both perspectives were Utopian. One 
looked toward decreasing economic intervention 
while maintaining political control. The other 
looked toward decreasing political control while 
maintaining economic intervention. The contradic-
tion between these two positions created serious 
institutional gaps that allowed the emergence of an 
incipient peasant production system but also seri-
ously jeopardized the effectiveness of the reforms 
put in place. 
2. A truncated peasant economy 
After examining the complexities and contradictions 
of political control over the ejido, one wonders how it 
managed to survive for so long. As already noted 
earlier, the answer lies in the dual role of the ejido as 
an insurance device and as a political apparatus. We 
will now deal with its role as an insurance device, 
which is another way of saying that the ejido played 
an important role as a body of peasant representation. 
This is clearly linked with the particular form of op-
eration of the peasant economy. It is well known that 
the peasant economy is based on the household as a 
production and consumption unit and on a series of 
mutual assistance practices between the households 
in a community. The ejido provided this peasant 
economy with an institutional arrangement that 
linked these two crucial elements with a third ele-
ment of equal importance: access to common prop-
erty resources. 
However, the way the political control model 
was implemented distorted the three elements of the 
ejido peasant economy. The adjudication of land 
plots to the head of the household, and the almost 
complete absence of legal rights for the other 
household members, sowed seeds of conflict. It is 
apparent, when reviewing ejido conflicts over the 
past decades, that family disputes were common 
-conflicts between fathers and sons, between hus-
bands and wives, and among children. These con-
flicts have escalated because enormous demographic 
transformations have taken place in the ejidos, 
particularly since the 1970s, but the ejidos have not 
had the necessary flexibility to accommodate these 
changes. The original ejidatarios have aged, and 
many new settlers (avecindados) have come to the 
ejido villages (sometimes outnumbering the eji-
datarios), even though they could not acquire the 
status of official members of the ejido. Another im-
portant factor has been the extensive migration to 
other parts of the country and to the United States. 
Traditional peasant production practices based 
on native seeds, biological control, organic fertilizers, 
animal traction and intercropping were degraded 
by a truncated process of technological modern-
ization that was initiated by government organiza-
tions for research and development in agriculture, 
Indeed, until recently intercropping was expressly 
excluded from credit support despite its being a cor-
nerstone of peasant farming systems. There were also 
no clear rules about access to common lands. This 
has led not only to illegal appropriations of land but 
also to the acceleration of social differentiation 
within the ejido and to severe ecological degradation 
of ejido resources. Thus, the ejido sector had become 
a truncated peasant economy that coexisted with a 
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State model of political control: in other words, it 
was a repressed peasant economy in the grip of the 
State. The ejido was both the apparatus that embod-
ied the State's political control over peasants and the 
form of organization of production and representation 
that allowed the peasant logic to be utilized and re-
produced. Compatibility between State logic and 
peasant logic had been achieved through the exist-
ence of secondary markets that combined controls 
and subsidies, but inevitably, when this unstable 
equilibrium started to fall apart, the political control 
model was also decisively affected. 
When using the term "peasant production sys-
tem", it is necessary to guard against any Chay-
anovian interpretation of this peasant agriculture, 
as well as against any revival of the old peasant 
extinction/survival polemic that raged in the 1970s in 
Mexican academic circles. The peasant production 
system referred to here is characterized by its search 
for a form of integration in the market system: a po-
sition based on the comparative advantages of ejido 
agriculture vis-à-vis private agriculture. Ejido agri-
culture has an advantage because of its reliance on 
family labour, community organization, access to col-
lective resources, strong participation in labour mar-
kets, and particularly its reliance on national and 
international migration. 
We will now turn to the basic traits of this peas-
ant production system and the way they developed in 
the context of the changes that occurred in the ejido 
sector between 1990 and 1994. Comparison of the 
results of the 1994 ejido survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the University of 
California at Berkeley with those of the survey car-
ried out in 1990 by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Water Resources and ECLAC will help to give an idea 
of the transformation of the ejido sector in the midst 
of a profound crisis in the entire Mexican agricultural 
sector (de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet, 1997).This 
larger crisis has been marked by adverse economic 
incentives, shrinking public support and wide institu-
tional gaps. 
In the following analysis of farm sizes, individ-
ual plots of land are measured in hectares of national 
rainfed equivalent land (HNRE), which correspond to 
the observed average yields of rainfed maize, by 
agroecological region, in order to adjust area for 
quality differentials. The unit of measurement is a 
hectare of rainfed maize that produces the 1994 na-
tional average yield of 1.09 tons. 
a) Concentration of the land in small holdings23 
If the ejidatarios are classified by the size of 
their plots and their geographical region, we observe 
that between 1990 and 1994 there has been a process 
of concentration of small holdings in most regions 
except in the Pacific South. There has thus been a 
slow process of elimination of the most extreme 
forms of minifundio. This suggests that a partial solu-
tion to rural poverty could be found through the 
abandonment of the smallest plots, i.e., through mi-
gration and non-farm employment. Several aspects of 
the ejido reforms have contributed to this abandon-
ment. One is the newly acquired freedom to rent land, 
which has allowed the smallest farmers to rent out 
their land and engage in other activities. The other is 
greater flexibility to participate in off-farm activities 
and migration without the threat of losing land rights 
in the ejido. The decline of the minifundio has been 
less rapid in the Gulf and Pacific South regions, 
where indigenous attachment to the land is more 
prevalent and from where migration to the United 
States is not as intense. In these two regions, where 
the incidence of extreme poverty is highest, a solu-
tion to rural poverty thus cannot be expected to come 
simply from migration and export of the poverty 
problem to other sectors and regions. 
b) Consolidation of peasant farming systems: inter-
cropped maize cultivation 
One of the most notable features of the 1990-
1994 period has been the expansion of the land 
planted with maize. This has been induced both by 
price distortions that favour maize over other crops 
and by price guarantees that eliminate the element of 
risk. Maize has thus been a relatively attractive crop 
during the last four years. In the ejidos, the result has 
been a 20% increase in the area planted with maize in 
rainfed areas and a 68% increase in irrigated areas. 
On rainfed land, 66% of the increase corresponded to 
monocropping and 34% to intercropping. The first is 
typical of farms with a greater commercial orienta-
tion and the latter of peasant farming systems. Most 
of the increase (84%) came from farms of more than 
5 hectares of NRE, where land formerly in pastures 
and fallow was shifted to maize. Most of the increase 
in intercropped maize (72%) occurred on smaller 
23
 This section is based on de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet 
(1997). 
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farms, where it reflects the use of typical peasant 
farming systems. On irrigated land, 91% of the ex-
pansion in maize cultivation was on the larger farms, 
where it displaced traditional cereals such as wheat 
and oilseeds, and 97% of this expansion was in 
monocropped maize. On the smaller farms, there was 
an increase in intercropped maize. On the larger 
farms, the expansion was principally in commercial 
types of monocropping, which accounted for most of 
the aggregate expansion. The response to incentives 
to produce more maize thus accelerated the process 
of differentiation, with smaller farms increasingly 
specializing in peasant farming systems and larger 
farms in commercial farming systems. 
c) Technological regression 
It is clear that there was a severe retrogression in 
the technological level of the ejidos on virtually all 
fronts and across all types of farms during the 1990-
1994 period. Looking again at maize, the only excep-
tion to this technological regression was the diffusion 
of improved seeds on the larger farms. For the rest, 
there was a sharp decline in the use of chemical prod-
ucts and fertilizers. The sector was virtually aban-
doned in terms of access to public technical 
assistance, across all farm sizes. Simultaneously, 
there was a general increase in the use of manual 
labour in agricultural work and a decline in the use of 
machinery. The sector thus coped with the profitabil-
ity crisis by using less technology per unit of produc-
tion and reverting to family labour. 
d) Strong orientation towards production for home 
use 
In order to bring out the prevalence of a peasant 
economy and the depth of social differentiation within 
the ejido sector, we may look at the degree of participa-
tion of ejidatario maze producers in the market for that 
cereal, either as sellers or as buyers. We thus see that 
41% are sellers or seller/buyers of maize, while 27% 
are pure buyers. Another 31% are self-sufficient, us-
ing the maize they produce principally for home con-
sumption (24%) and to a lesser extent for feeding 
animals (7%). This reveals a sharply differentiated uni-
verse of maize producers, where less than half partici-
pate in the market as sellers. It is this group of sellers 
that will be hurt if there is a fall in the price of maize, as 
is expected under NAFTA. The other 59% will either 
not be directly affected by maize prices or will actu-
ally be benefited by falling prices as net buyers. 
These net buyers and self-sufficient producers with-
out large herds of animals are smaller farmers with 
little irrigated land. The existence of a strong peasant 
economy will thus cushion the negative effect of a 
fall in the price of maize, which will have a sharply 
differential effect across different categories of 
maize-producing households, depending on their po-
sition with regard to the market for this cereal. 
Some conclusions for the near future 
The changes observed in the ejido sector between 
1990 and 1994 therefore reflect the following phe-
nomena: 
• The impact of macroeconomic policies, charac-
terized by effective control of inflation but also 
by a serious profitability crisis in agriculture 
linked to decreasing global growth rates, increas-
ing appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall 
in the real support prices of the main staple 
crops, high interest rates, and the loss of subsi-
dies to the sector. 
• An institutional vacuum created by the decline in 
the State's role in agriculture, leading to the pri-
vatization, scaling down or liquidation of many 
of the public institutions supporting the sector 
and only a very partial reconstruction of alterna-
tive institutions to support the ejidos. In general, 
this reduced the availability and raised the cost 
of access to credit, insurance, markets, modern 
inputs, seeds, water, and technical assistance. 
• The beginning of a process of adjustment to the 
new economic and institutional rules by ejidatarios 
and by the ejido as a form of organization. 
By 1994, the changes in the legal statutes codify-
ing the use and ownership of ejido land had already 
activated the land rental market. The reforms had also 
liberalized individual and community initiatives, al-
lowing numerous adjustments in the production sys-
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tern, in household income -earning strategies, and in 
the organization of the ejido- adjustments that had 
been prohibited before the constitutional reforms or 
had been carried out illegally. 
What we observed between 1990 and 1994 was 
thus an ejido sector in crisis, at the initial stages of a 
long process of adaptation and transformation. The ob-
vious difficulties that ejidatarios confronted were partly 
contextual and structural, but they were also symptoms 
of a difficult and protracted process of transition to-
wards economic and political liberalization. 
We may conclude by observing that the outcome 
of the second Mexican agrarian reform process initi-
ated by President Salinas is still far from certain. Lib-
eralization of the ejido has unleashed numerous 
individual and collective initiatives that have pro-
duced visible adjustments, showing the ability of this 
vast sector to respond to incentives. At the same time, 
the overall context of economic crisis in agriculture 
and dismantling of rural sector institutions has re-
duced the economic benefits that the reforms could 
have yielded, and hence the scope of the modern-
ization and diversification that was expected to follow. 
The main step in the reforms -namely, the individual 
titling of ejido lands in usufruct- has hardly begun. And 
the ultimate outcome of the reforms is tied to the 
resolution of much broader economic and political 
questions with which Mexico is still struggling: on 
the economic side, restoration of economic growth, 
maintenance of a competitive real exchange rate, and 
creation of jobs; on the political side, implementation 
of participatory democracy, decentralization of gov-
ernment, and enforcement of the rule of law. 
What is certain is that this second agrarian re-
form process offers major opportunities to improve 
efficiency and welfare in the ejido sector. Years of 
neglect and cumulative contradictions between the 
functions of the ejido as a mechanism for simultane-
ously achieving political control over the peasantry, 
representing peasants, and organizing production by 
smallholders had created a huge efficiency gap that 
now needs to be filled. Analysis of success stories 
can help to identify the measures that must be pur-
sued to fill this gap (de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet, 
1997). They include a favourable macroeconomic envi-
ronment, institutional reconstruction, promotion of or-
ganizations (in particular through the ejido system), 
and public investment in irrigation and education. 
The agrarian reform initiative needs to be comple-
mented by a comprehensive programme of rural de-
velopment in support of the land reform 
beneficiaries: a programme that still needs to be put 
into place (de Janvry and others, 1996). Because of 
the high level of heterogeneity of farm households, a 
rural development programme for the ejido sector 
should focus not only on agriculture but also on the 
other sources of income accessible to ejidatarios. 
This means that it will be necessary to coordinate the 
interventions of a whole range of public and private 
institutions. Unless these measures are rapidly imple-
mented, the majority of smallholders in the ejido sec-
tor are unlikely to be competitive, and they risk being 
displaced by a small number of well-endowed entre-
preneurs in the ejido and the private sector as the land 
market is perfected. Failure to be competitive would 
thus lead to massive displacement of smallholders 
and to pressures on the urban labour markets and the 
border to the north. In the interests of global eco-
nomic efficiency, the welfare of a large segment of 
the Mexican poor, and political stability, it is there-
fore urgent that the agrarian reform process under 
way should be complemented by a broader range of 
initiatives to help the agrarian reform beneficiaries to 
become competitive in the new economic and institu-
tional context before the process of granting title 
deeds is completed and the market for land sales is 
activated by the reforms. 
(Original: English) 
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